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Losing Pravda: Ethics and The Press in Post-Truth Russia By Natalia Roudakova 
ÔYes, [the journalist] has a right to vymysel [fabrication of detail] and domy-
sel [guesswork] Ñ to exaggeration based, if you will, on intuition É But one 
has to guess truthfully, so as not to arouse doubt in the reader.Õ  
Ñ from a textbook for journalists by Valery Agranovsky, published in the So-
viet Union in 1978, (quoted in Roudakova p.63) 
 Ô[There] are things that donÕt necessarily need to be true as long as theyÕre 
believed.Õ Alexander Nix, CEO of Cambridge Analytica  1
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a sense in which we are living 
in a post-truth era, is post-truth something that is completely new or something 
that has always been with us? There is no shortage of arguments in favour of one or 
the other of these interpretations. Some of the things that have been mooted as 
definitive of the post-truth era, such as the online economy of attention, are 
clearly very new. Others, such as cynicism about the motives of powerful people 
and scepticism about their claims, are probably universal. There is nothing puz-
zling about that. Contempt for the truth, like most of the phenomena that anthro-
pologists deal with, is surely the result of a mixture of factors, some of which are 
very much of their time, associated with particular people and their practices and 
strategic interests, and, at the same time, very old and rooted in centuries-old in-
stitutions and universal human capacities.  
In order to work our way out of simplistic oppositions into a more nuanced and 
flexible understanding of contemporary attitudes to truth and fakery, we could do 
worse than to consider comparable cases in which seeking or speaking truth is de-
valued, or in which the notion of truth itself loses its currency. Losing Pravda, Na-
talia RoudakovaÕs fascinating and ambitious study of Russian journalism through 
the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, presents an opportunity to do just that. Based on a 
combination of analyses of published newspaper articles, textbooks and memoirs 
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popular Leninskaya Smena, and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in newspaper 
offices in Nizhny Novgorod in the early 2000s, the book details the changing nature 
of journalism as a profession defined above all by its relationship to truth.  
The introduction presents, as overdue for correction, a widely accepted narra-
tive of journalism in Russia and the Soviet Union that runs as follows: newspapers 
and other media were nothing but tools of propaganda for most of the Soviet era, 
Glasnost and then the adoption of international professional journalistic standards 
in the early 1990s allowed for real freedom of the press and a commitment to 
truthÑa golden era that was short-lived because the corruption of YeltsinÕs later 
years, and then the authoritarianism of PutinÕs rule meant a return to the bad old 
days.  
Roudakova claims to have uncovered a more complex picture. While she agrees 
that recent decades have seen an erosion of the value placed on truth in Russian 
journalism, she argues that the result, which she characterises as widespread cyni-
cism, is quite different from that seen in the Soviet period. Before the fall of 
Communism, journalists were subject to heavy censorship and played a central 
role in the production and dissemination of propaganda. Nonetheless, Roudakova 
insists, most members of the profession were  keenly concerned with seeking and 
speaking truth, albeit in ways that might seem exotic to us from our twenty-first 
century viewpoint.  
In the Soviet period, newspapers and other media organisations were organs of 
the governing Communist Party. Journalists were expected to develop propagand-
istic narratives under the direction of the Party. For most of the period, galley 
proofs were signed off by Party censors before each dayÕs edition was allowed to 
go to press. Newspapers carried little in the way of news in the sense of up-to-the-
moment coverage of what was happening in the USSR and abroad. Instead, they 
published essays, including ocherkiÑlengthy morality tales based on real life stor-
ies. Where newspapers had a news department, it tended to be small and unap-
preciated. For example, Leninskaya Smena featured news, in a column on the 
front page, charmlessly referred to as the Ônews holeÕ. During the 70s and 80s, this 
was the domain of Valentina Buzmakova, a senior journalist who was considered 
eccentric because she enjoyed being a reporter. She was supported by an ever-
changing team of interns in a hurry to get out of news and into proper journalism. 
Roudakova explains that even Buzmakova could find only enough news to fill the 
news hole once or twice a week.  
And yet, within the constraints of censorship and notwithstanding the aversion 
to ÔnewsÕ, there was space for an attachment, in some cases a passionate attach-
ment, to journalism as a professional practice defined by truth-seeking and truth-
speaking. Yes, the press was censored, but the censorsÕ concerns were generally 
narrow. Journalists could not question socialism. Censors would not allow them to 
report on accidents, disasters or particularly violent crime. The personal lives of 
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Soviet leaders were also out of bounds. Those were important limitations, of 
course, but they left plenty of topics about which it was possible to speak truth to 
power, and to everyone else. This space for fact-finding, exposure and contention 
is an area that, according to Roudakova, has been little understood by work that 
concentrates on the constraints of Soviet political lifeÑwork such as Alexei Yur-
chakÕs influential study of Soviet era formalism (2005), of which she otherwise ap-
proves. 
 In fact, from the beginning, Roudakova explains, the Bolsheviks had publicly 
adopted a model of surveillance from below in which ordinary people had a duty to 
denounce the abuse of power by office holders. In the Soviet Union, the press was 
the main institution through which this accountability could be enforced. Though 
this meant the relationship of the press and the state could be difficult, Roudakova 
suggests that Soviet government depended on this function for its legitimacy and 
was thus constrained to recognise the freedom of the press to some, always limit-
ed, extent. When journalists received letters from Soviet citizens complaining of 
injustice, they were obliged to investigate, and some journalists were both willing 
and permitted to investigate allegations with sustained exposure of wrongdoing.  
Investigation, whether it was to look into an alleged abuse of power, or to 
gather materials for an ocherk, was not simply a formality. Journalism required 
fieldwork. Roudakova reports that Leninskaya Smena journalists were expected to 
spend about a third of their time in the field. Writers of ocherk might write only 
one or two pieces a year. In her memoirs, Inna Rudenko, a leading ocherkist for 
another national paper, the Komsomolskaya Pravda, recalled the lengths she went 
to in order to gather materials for her essays, in terms that will be resonant for 
any ethnographer: 
I lived their lives with them went to work with them, visited their friends 
with them, got to know their relatives, we drank tea together, went to the 
theater together. [É] I always brought back so many small details, subtle 
things. (Quoted on p. 63) 
Other ocherkists were not so punctilious: Rudenko remarks in the same passage 
that her colleagues said it was not possible to write a feature story without making 
up details. But if they fabricated minor particulars, that should not be taken as a 
sign that they did not care about the truth at all. The truth of an ocherk was a 
moral message with general application, and mastery of the genre was a matter of 
providing enough detail of the specific case in order to make the story so evocative 
that the general truth would become meaningful for the reader. As Anatoly Agran-
ovsky counselled in his textbook for aspiring journalists, ÔIt is important not to 
break yourself from reality so much that it would lead to an averaging of an image, 
to stereotypical descriptions. This would harm the truth and truthfulnessÕ (quoted 
on p. 63). Roudakova suggests that this focus on the imponderabilia of specific 
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cases even provided a way around the censors as skilled ocherkists could hint at 
widespread social problems while never raising their eyes from the prosaic level of 
their particular case studies.  
*** 
In 1990, Russia passed a law on the press forbidding censorship, removing the 
party/state monopoly on media ownership, and taking steps to ensure a degree of 
editorial independence from owners. The Russian government, keen to be seen to 
be supporting democracy provided grants to support press outlets. These develop-
ments spurred an exciting period of activity for journalists. Roudakova reports that 
newspaper editors and founders of private television channels spoke in heady tones 
about the responsibility of independent media to hold the government to account, 
influenced by international discourses of accountability and transparency.  
This excitement about the new fourth estate was not to last. YeltsinÕs economic 
liberalization, beginning in January 1992, led immediately to a sharp rise in the 
cost of paper and ink. Rapidly growing inflation meant ordinary Russians, once en-
thusiastic consumers of print media, bought fewer and fewer newspapers and 
magazines. Editors resorted to barter with printing presses, paper mills and banks, 
first offering advertising space, then shares. Journalists left established newspa-
pers to join new enterprises, which often quickly failed. As media enterprises ran 
out of cash, salaries were slashed and then went unpaid.  
Some publications limped on, then petered out. Others found a novel solution 
for their money problems, one that once again shifted the nature of journalistic 
practice. The advent of contentious democratic elections in the early 1990s pre-
sented an opportunity for the media. Roudakova explains that in the absence of 
rules on election coverage such as existed in established democracies, ambiguity 
arose over the boundary between paid-for political advertising on the one hand 
and coverage that simply happened to benefit a candidate on the other. In the run 
up to the election, television channels and newspapers invited the candidates to 
sign contracts for promotional coverage. The mechanics of this process are not 
completely clear on my reading of the book, but my understanding of the account 
is that any coverage of the candidate, including simply appearing on screen was 
subsequently counted as political advertising and charged for. Candidates also ap-
pear to have been charged for any negative coverage of their opponents.  
Media outlets had found an important source of fundingÑthe periodic glut of 
funding associated with elections came to be known as the Ôharvest yieldÕ. Howev-
er, by interpreting all political reporting as promotion of this or that political fac-
tion, they significantly undermined the idea that journalists were involved in a 
pursuit of truth beyond partisan spin. It was not until 2002 that a law on advertis-
ing attempted to regulate this situation. However, it did so by defining political 
advertising not as paid-for content, but as Ôactivity aiding to create a positive or a 
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negative impression of a candidate among votersÕ (117). The ironic result, 
Roudakova argues, was to undermine journalistic truthfulness yet further. All cov-
erage of political issues was now legally classified as advertising, and had to be 
placed in editorial sections of newspapers marked as opinion rather than news.  
Far from establishing itself as the fourth estate as had been hoped in the brief, 
hopeful period of 1990-91, journalism came to be knownÑamong journalists tooÑ
as the Ôsecond oldest professionÕ, which was a snide way of saying that journalists 
were simply prostitutes. According to Roudakova, journalists themselves also lost 
the sense that they were engaged in a common practice with common standards. 
In the offices of The Observer, where she conducted fieldwork in 2002, only a few 
of the most senior journalists had been working for more than a year. Junior roles 
were subject to rapid churn, filled by inexperienced staff without the skills or 
wherewithal to take a stand against the instrumentalization of journalistic prac-
tice. Accusations of unprofessionalism were everywhere, writes Roudakova,  
These accusations were compounded by the breakdown of the Soviet system 
of on-the-job mentorship and peer control among journalists, by fast spread 
of behind-closed-doors appraisals of journalistic labor by private employers, 
by fast turnover of personnel, and by an understanding that journalistic 
ethics was now a deeply personal rather than collective matter. (123) 
However, Roudakova takes issue with accounts of this period that leave no room 
for journalistic ethics at all. Journalists she interviewed and worked with did, she 
explains, try to justify their work in moral terms, even if they could rarely see 
themselves as being engaged in a practice of truth-seeking and truth-telling. In-
stead, some they justified their practice in terms of being being good team players 
or loyal friends, willing to do what was necessary to bring in money for their orga-
nizations..  
As the 2000s wore on, PutinÕs consolidation of power across the country meant 
that truly contentious elections at any level became rarer. Money for election cov-
erage dried up, so media organizations increasingly entered into contracts to pro-
vide tiers of government with public relations services instead. As politicians faced 
less competition for journalistsÕ favour, their attitude became more brazen. Jour-
nalists complained they were being treated as servants, and were increasingly sub-
ject to harassment and even assassination if they did not fulfil that role. At the 
same time, they frequently faced insults and abuse when dealing with a public 
that had lost all respect for the profession.  
In 2012, the deputy minister of mass communication, Alexei Volin, was invited 
to speak at a conference held at the Department of Journalism at Moscow State 
University. Roudakova takes his contemptuous speech as emblematic of the cyni-
cism of RussiaÕs leaders at that time. He responded to the title of the conference, 
ÔJournalism and its public missionÕ, by telling the assembled journalists, lecturers 
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and students that, 
Journalism has no mission. Journalism is a business. Young journalists should 
know that they will be writing whatever their owner tells them. If you are 
not teaching them about that part of the job, you are committing a crime. 
(178) 
The book ends on a more optimistic note, describing the  the practice of speak-
ing truth to power and rejection of cynicism that characterised some of the media 
reaction to opposition protests in 2011 and 2012. Magazines and newspapers cov-
ered the crisis and when editors were put under pressure by owners to curtail their 
coverage, there were some high-profile resignations. Journalists and bloggers be-
gan to promote the virtue of accuracy and dialed down the pathos or sensational-
ism that had come to pass for a sign of truthfulness during the long years of cyni-
cism. 
*** 
RoudakovaÕs book is subtitled Ethics and the Press in Post-Truth Russia, but the 
term Ôpost-truthÕ does not appear in the index, and the obvious comparison with 
the erosion of trust in journalism associated with Trump and Brexit is only men-
tioned in the final few pages of the book. Nonetheless, I think the book is an im-
portant resource for those of us interested in understanding post-truth in other so-
cieties, and not only because the unabashed cynicism of the Russian establishment 
and its instrumental use of media have latterly come to intersect in significant 
ways with the production and consumption of news in Europe and the US.  
Roudakova analyses the transformation of Soviet and Russian journalism at a 
number of different levels of abstraction. The book is densely argued and in the 
summary above I have omitted much of the discussion of thinkers from Foucault to 
Habermas to Sloterdijk. In places, the author speaks in terms of timeless categor-
ies such as ideology and propaganda (the latter is defined as an instance of Ôin-
strumental communicationÕ in HabermasÕs terms). In other places, she makes 
broad-brush distinctions between socialist and capitalist epistemology. The latter 
is supposedly based on a relativist or pluralist conception of truth; because of ad-
vertising, Roudakova claims that members of capitalist societies expect and toler-
ate lies. On the other hand, she sees Soviet socialism as having been based on a 
form of epistemological realism, in which the truth of historical materialism could 
be taken for granted and the only questions to answer were how it manifested in 
the world and how the present situation differed fromÑthat is, fell shortÑof the 
future in which socialism was to have been realised. For my money, these attempts 
at high theoretical analysis ring hollow in comparison with the rich and multi-
factorial accounts of journalistic practice that they attempt to explain. Maybe 
there is something in the idea of Soviet epistemological realism, but it inevitably 
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runs into the problem of the complexity and contingency of the data in relation to 
which it can only seem simplistic.  
The same could be said for RoudakovaÕs use of virtue ethics, another important 
strand of analysis running through the book. Drawing on Bernard WilliamsÕ Truth 
and truthfulness (2002), Roudakova identifies six virtues associated with seeking 
and speaking the truth: concern with accuracy, standing by oneÕs words, sincerity, 
seriousness, reflexivity, and courage. Again, in my view, the reduction of journal-
istsÕ complex practices to these context-free virtues adds little to our understand-
ing, because it flattens the ethnographic specificity. Virtues are clearly an import-
ant part of being a journalist on RoudakovaÕs account, but they are historically 
specific virtuesÑthe virtue of being, for example, a good ocherkistÑwhose value is 
internal to the practice, tied up in specific forms, institutions and relationships, 
and which are ultimately irreducible to transhistorical categories of accuracy, sin-
cerity and so on.  
What makes it possible for RoudakovaÕs book to transcend the analytical categories 
that she attempts to impose on her material is the fact that her key comparison is 
not between something that sheÕs really interested in on the one hand and some 
idealized alternative or unspecified ÔweÕ , that serves merely as a contrast, as is so 2
often the practice in anthropological analysis. True, in a number of places she does 
contrast Soviet and Russian journalism with a basically ahistorical ideal of the 
press in liberal democracies derived from her discussion of thinkers such as Hannah 
ArendtÑa definition that is supposed to apply, presumably, from the first French 
Republic to TrumpÕs America. However, the comparison that matters is the juxta-
position of Soviet-era journalism and post-Soviet Russian journalism. Neither is a 
mere foil for the other, each is presented in vivid detail, and the heterogeneity 
and contingency of causes emerges irrepressibly from the page. It becomes clear 
that the journalistic commitment to truth is no more dependent on a specific con-
ception of the public sphere than it is on the price of paper or the unintended con-
sequences of media regulation.  
That is not to say that no neat contrasts emerge from the detail. In a blog post 
about a 2012 case in which an opposition leader claimed to have been tortured and 
government officials flatly denied the accusations, Tomsk-based journalist Yulia 
Muchnik complained that the comparisons that were then being drawn with the 
time of StalinÕs Great Terror were misleading. ÔThis reality is hideous, disgusting, 
absurdÕ, she wrote, 
But most importantlyÑit is different. Éno one believes anybody, anything 
can turn out to be true or not true. Everything is relative, no oneÕs authority 
is respected, all words are worthless, all slogans disgusting. ÉThis is a very 
different reality, where none of us had been before. (192) 
Ultimately, this is RoudakovaÕs conclusion, too. The cynicism of the contempo-
 http://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/ChuaWho2
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rary period looks superficially like the disengagement of the Soviet era, but they 
are different in at least two respects. First, Soviet leaders and cultural producers 
such as journalists could never have admitted to cynicism openly. (Reacting angrily 
to a claim that the profession has always been cynical, one of RoudakovaÕs veteran 
journalists wonders why contemporary cynicism is thought to be preferable to the 
hypocrisy of her own generation.) Second, cynicism in the Soviet period was limit-
edÑjournalists and politicians may have scorned this or that policy or politician, 
but they tended to do so in a way that was congruent with the aims of socialism. 
Journalists, in particular, were able to see their scepticism as kritika and samokri-
tikaÑthe criticism and self-criticism that Lenin thought were a distinctive part of 
the socialist system of government.  
This distinction between Soviet and post-Soviet journalism supports a further, 
ideal-type distinction with more general application, one that may help us to un-
derstand the variety of Ôpost-truthÕ in other contexts. It is a distinction between 
two attitudes that look similar from the point of view of an external observer, but 
different from the inside. On the one hand, there is contempt for the idea of truth 
and the virtues that produce it. This is exemplified by the cynical attitude that 
Roudakova sees as widespread, though not universal, among Russian journalists, 
media owners and politicians in much of the Post-Soviet era.  
On the other hand, there are situations in which truth is valued, but in a way 
that is very different from, or in conflict with, the way in which the observer un-
derstands or values truth. That is to say, there are people who may look to others 
as though they have a cavalier disregard for truthfulness because they are labour-
ing under a programme or regime of truth (to borrow vocabulary from Paul Veyne, 
1988, not cited in RoudakovaÕs book) with which those who observe them are not 
familiar or do not accept, but which nonetheless imposes its own authorising 
knowledge practices and truth conditions. Producing and recognising truth are not 
context free activities, but ones that can depend on a combination of learned 
knowledge and skills including implicit or explicit theories about the nature of the 
mind (that is, about metacognition), of expertise, evidence, forms of expression of 
truth and so on. This is the way Roudakova wants us to understand Soviet-era jour-
nalists. They cared about the truthÑat least some of them did, and they were re-
spected for itÑdespite their adherence to practices and standards that look scan-
dalous or perverse by the standards of other kinds of journalism.  
Another way of expressing this distinction is to say that someone who wishes to 
understand other peopleÕs relationship to truth must learn to distinguish rigorously 
between the lack of a commitment to truthfulness and a commitment that differs 
so greatly from his or her own that it looks like a lack. Getting this right is, it 
seems to me, a crucial element in the ethnographic study of Ôpost-truthÕ. Rather 
than trying to define a post-truth syndrome in general terms, we would do better 
to ask, for specific individuals and groups involved in producing or consuming con-
tent that is described as post-truth, to what extent they are really contemptuous 
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of truthfulness rather than being engaged in distinctive programmes of truth. Is 
the sort of conspiracy-theory-based interpretation of the news characteristic of 
Alex JonesÕ Infowars website and many alt-right imitators pure cynicism and in-
strumentalization of content? Or is it a distinctive practice of truth production? Are 
climate sceptics simply cynics? Some, like the Russian politicians and media owners 
Roudakova describes, clearly think public discourse is a sort of Gramscian war of 
position. On the other hand, as much as scientists may despair at climate scepticsÕ 
rejection of scientific canons such as peer review, it is evident that many of the 
sceptics see themselves as the true heirs of the scientific spirit of the Enlighten-
ment, heeding KantÕs exhortation to dare to know by shrugging off the childish at-
tachment to authority and established opinion.  
Understanding the different modes in which people value truthfulness or dep-
recate it by recognizing the plurality of regimes of truth, will be essential if we 
want to contribute to making sense of the culture and politics of truth of our time. 
This is something we should aspire to do if we havenÕt given up on anthropology 
itself being a practice of truth-seeking and truth-speaking, which I hope we 
havenÕt. RoudakovaÕs careful and complex comparison of Soviet-era and post-Sovi-
et Russian journalism will provide us with a valuable model for how to go about 
this task.  
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